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1 Introduction 
Health is often a determining factor for a person's well-being and a parameter for 
his or her ability to function independently and participate autonomously in soci-
ety. The latter also explains the importance we attach to health. Human health, 
however, defined, is therefore a very precious good. This is reflected by the fact 
that health has also been coined as a human right under international human 
rights law. The importance of health is acknowledged by EU law and other inter-
national and regional organizations, while the Dutch Constitution rather mod-
estly stipulates that the State is required to take measures to promote public 
health.1 
Despite all the advances in health research and the exponentially growing number 
of improved treatment options, human health is not a commodity. This also 
impacts on access to justice for both patients and health care providers, as will be 
argued in this contribution. The same holds true with respect to our body and its 
constituent parts, such as blood, organs and human tissue. We as human beings 
are not, legally speaking, the owners of our bodies, but we have say over it - often 
referred to as 'authority' or 'self-determination'. Human health and the human 
body must, according to Kantian theory of morality, never be treated as a means 
to an end. This explains, in a nutshell, why people cannot freely possess of their 
body as if it were their property and why medical liability cases are contested, 
given the (moral) difficulty to measure harm. Around the world, people are for-
bidden to treat their bodies and to expose themselves to forms of risks when con-
sidered contrary to the principles of humanity and human dignity. An example of 
such forms of commodification of human health and the human body is the sell-
ing of one's kidneys. For similar reasons, individual health care providers are pro-
fessionals that should abide by the highest professional standards. Health care 
providers, like physicians and nurses, are therefore not merely 'repairers' of 
human health obliged to follow the instructions of their clients ('patients'). To the 
contrary, the professional autonomy of individual health care providers may col-
lide with and generally overrules the autonomy of patients (individual self-deter-
mination) to choose for certain forms of treatment. 
The special, almost sacral, status of human health and the human body as well as 
the professional responsibilities and duties of health care providers towards their 
patients have had a severe impact on access to justice for patients dissatisfied 
with the health care services provided to them, and the compensation they may 
wish to obtain for alleged medical faults. Challenging the quality and safety of the 
1 Article 22 para 1 Constitution (Grondwet). 
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services of health care providers is even more difficult for patients now that 
health care providers generally possess more knowledge about health and treat-
ment options than the average patient. This makes the patient vulnerable and 
dependent. All these factors add to the - real or perceived - inequality of powers 
between health care providers and patients, also negatively impacting on access 
to justice for the latter. But there are more reasons why access to justice for 
patients is not self-evident and why this issue merits further analysis. 
For a long time, the provision of health care was surrounded by a myth of charity. 
This imposed an additional hurdle for patients to contest a form of treatment or 
the behaviour of a health care provider, let alone to do this before a tribunal, to 
claim compensation for damage they allegedly incurred. The charitable character 
of health care can be illustrated by pointing at the fact that health care providers 
often would not charge a fee, but an honorarium payment for their work by which 
way a patient could express his or her gratitude for the services received. Health 
care providers can also invoke the 'medical exception', to justify forms of treat-
ment grossly violating the bodily integrity of a person, such as the amputation of 
a limb, the performance of a caesarean section or carrying out an operation. 
These interventions with the bodily integrity of a person normally constitute a 
criminal offence. When performed by a health care professional, however, the 
health care provider will be excluded from criminal liability - thus the term 'medi-
cal exception' - when he or she acted with the informed consent of the patient 
concerned and performed the act professionally. The 'medical exception' may oth-
erwise pose a barrier for patients towards access to justice. To sum up, access to 
justice for patients is everything but self-evident. 
In this contribution I will describe and analyze the extent to which access to jus-
tice is guaranteed in the health care sector in the Netherlands. In doing so I will 
start by examining the evolution of patients' rights in the Netherlands, with a 
focus on the right of a patient to litigate or otherwise file a complaint against a 
health care provider, as a corollary of access to justice for patients. Subsequently I 
will discuss how the strengthening of access to justice for patients and the need 
to safeguard the quality and safety of health care may threaten the fundamental 
rights of health care providers. At the end of this contribution, I will summarize 
the main conclusions. 
2 Access to justice for patients. Historical developments 
2.1 From objects of care to persons with rights 
For a long time, patients were merely seen as objects of care rather than legal sub-
jects with rights. It was only after the Second World War that patients' rights 
started to emerge in response to the atrocities committed during these dark years 
towards such groups as psychiatric patients and research subjects. Psychiatric 
patients were (and are) often deprived by their liberty, subjected to forced treat-
ment and not in a position to enforce the enjoyment of other fundamental rights, 
whereas the latter were exposed to medical experiments, often without their 
prior knowledge, let alone permission. This background explains why the first 
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generation of patients' rights notably aimed to protect the negative autonomy of 
the patient, emphasizing the right of patients to refuse forms of treatment and 
by allowing them to make their own choices with respect to health and health 
care. This was done by underlining the right to physical and mental integrity and 
by emphasizing respect for informed consent as a precondition for a medical 
intervention. In addition, all kind of substantive and procedural guarantees were 
introduced to protect the liberty of patients with mental health problems, conta-
gious diseases or other conditions potentially dangerous for the persons them-
selves or others against the arbitrary deprivation of freedom and interferences 
with their integrity. 
In a later stage, as of the late 1970s, the entitlements corresponding with positive 
autonomy, such as the right to health care and to health insurance, gradually and 
often reluctantly found legal recognition in the Netherlands and many other 
countries around the world. It became acknowledged that States should ensure 
equal access to health care and protect patients against all kind of health hazards, 
disseminate health information and prevent patients from being subjected to all 
kinds of treatment without their informed consent. Equally, States became 
obliged to respect choices patients made, including choices that could be detri-
mental to their health and life. Also, States became obliged to fulfil certain human 
rights obligations, such as with respect to access to essential health care and envi-
ronmental protection. Thus the typology of human rights obligations - respect, 
protect, and fulfil - became fully applicable to health, turning health into a full 
human right. 
Access to justice for patients emerged in a similar, seemingly haphazard way. But 
before turning to the right of a patient to complain, to sue or to otherwise insti-
tute a (quasi) legal procedure against a health care provider, allow me to refer 
briefly to probably the oldest way to hold health care providers responsible for 
professional misconduct and to guarantee the quality and safety of health care: 
medical disciplinary law. 
2.2 Medical disciplinary law 
Disciplinary law is, traditionally, a system of law to guarantee the proper func-
tioning of the liberal professions, such as solicitors, notaries, members of the 
clergy and medical doctors. According to the Dutch Constitution, the State can 
introduce a system of disciplinary law. When doing so, this should be done by law.2 
In the Netherlands, a system of disciplinary law for physicians was introduced in 
1903. This was done by the Dutch Medical Association (Nederlandsche Maatschap-
pij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst or NMG), a non-governmental organization 
representing physicians. This system of disciplinary law only applied to the mem-
bers of this association. Since physicians were not required to become a member 
of the NMG, government felt that a private (association) law based system of dis-
ciplinary law fell short in upholding compliance with professional standards and 
in protecting the public at large. This resulted, in 1928, in the adoption of the 
Medical Disciplinary Act (Medische Tuchtwet or MTW), an administrative act 
2 Article 113 para 2 Constitution. 
Recht der Werkelijkheid 2015 (36) 3 129 
doi: 10.5553/RdW/138064242015036003011 
Aut Hendriks 
applying to all physicians and a limited number of other care providers, indepen-
dent on whether they were a member of the NMG or a similar association or not. 
Under the Medical Disciplinary Act, patients - besides others - were bestowed 
with the right to file a complaint against physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and 
midwifes. Up until today, plaintiffs are not required to pay a court fee when start-
ing a disciplinary procedure. The aim of the 1928 act was, however, not to satisfy 
or otherwise compensate a patient but to promote and guarantee good standards 
of health care. The nature of disciplinary procedures were - and are - therefore 
not compensatory in nature and the measures imposed are not considered to be 
'punitive' in terms of Article 6 of the ECHR. Thus, health care providers lack such 
legal guarantees as ne his in idem and the right not to incriminate oneself. For 
patients who started a disciplinary procedure under this act, a disciplinary proce-
dure is, however, often highly disappointing. In fact, their sole involvement was 
in the filing of a complaint. Otherwise, the patient had no say and the procedure 
was never meant to otherwise serve his or her individual rights or interests. In 
fact, the court procedures most often took place behind closed doors, and the dis-
ciplinary tribunals were dominated by medical professionals, fuelling the suspi-
cion of a conspiracy of silence. Also other basic rights with respect to fair trial and 
due process, guaranteed by the - later adopted - European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), were not guaranteed under the 1928 Medical Disciplinary 
Act, such as a public hearing and the presumption of innocence. 
In 1997 the MTW became replaced by Chapter VII of the Individual Health Care 
Professions Act (Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg 1993 or BIG). 
Even though the BIG introduced a number of changes with respect to disciplinary 
law - such as the number of professions subject to disciplinary law, the composi-
tion of the disciplinary courts, a public hearing, and the kind of measures that can 
be imposed in case of a well-founded complaint - these changes have not substan-
tially altered the rights and interests of plaintiffs. The emphasis of disciplinary 
law remained on guaranteeing the proper functioning of the provision of health 
care and of individual health care providers, and not on doing justice to individual 
patients or otherwise offer compensation to patients that were exposed to unpro-
fessional performance by a health care provider. In other words, medical discipli-
nary law cannot be considered as a means to promote access to justice for 
patients. 
In this respect, it merits attention that patients, since 1958, can no longer make 
use of the internal disciplinary law system of the Dutch Medical Association 
(since 1949 royal, thus KNMG) to file complaints. After a long discussion within 
the medical association about the overlap between the public and private law-
based disciplinary law systems, the KNMG decided that only members of the 
association became entitled to file disciplinary complaints against each other 
under the KNMG system. 
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3 Patients' right to access to justice 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned before, patients' rights emerged in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. This also holds true with respect to the Netherlands where patients' 
rights started to materialize as from the 1960s and 1970s, more or less in tandem 
with the development of health law. 
Access to justice, in terms of creating the necessary preconditions to litigate or 
otherwise start a (quasi) legal procedure against an individual or institutional 
health care provider, was not always the highest priority in the initial stages, as I 
will argue below. This may reflect a typical Dutch approach towards solving prob-
lems between patients and health care providers. Making use of a (quasi) legal 
procedure is generally perceived as a second best option to deal with such difficul-
ties. It is commonly thought that the best way to solve problems, including ques-
tions with respect to financial liability, is by seeking an out-of-court bilateral set-
tlement on the basis of the outcomes of a discussion between the parties 
involved, if necessary a dialogue facilitated by a complaints' officer, mediator, or 
other independent person. Having such a discussion depends, however, on the 
willingness of the parties involved to meet and speak and, if necessary, to apolo-
gize for what might have gone wrong. In my view, patients are and should not be 
required to (first) make use of an out-of-court option. An out-of-court procedure 
may not only be very burdensome but also may challenge access to justice. Access 
to a tribunal should therefore be guaranteed for those patients with complaints 
that meet a number of requirements. Let us therefore have a look of the legal pro-
cedures open to patients, besides the above-mentioned disciplinary law options. 
3.2 Medical liability law under civil law 
In the Netherlands, the main patients' rights act, the Medical Contract Law Act 
(Wet inzake de geneeskundige behandelingsovereenkomst, 1995, or Wgbo), has been 
integrated in the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek or BW). Under this law the rela-
tionship between a patient and a health care provider is defined as a contractual 
one, governed by the rules and principles of civil law with a number of inalienable 
rights for patients that cannot be derogated from, not even with the patient's 
consent. 
This act contains just one reference to access to justice for the patient: a patient 
that has been treated in a health care institution can always hold the health care 
institution liable for medical negligence, even if the institution was not a party to 
the contractual relationship between one or more individual health care providers 
and the patient.3 Otherwise, the Wgbo and the Civil Code in general are silent on 
access to justice for patients. 
What does this mean? A patient who holds the opinion that he or she is entitled 
to financial compensation for damage suffered as a result of a violation of his or 
her patients' rights or, more generally, of medical negligence or tort should start a 
civil law procedure. Depending on the height of the compensation claimed, the 
3 Article 7:462 Civil Code. 
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patient should then pay a court fee and bear the costs of legal aid. Although, the 
patient can ask for reimbursement of these costs after winning the case, he or she 
initially bears the risks of having to carry these costs. This may pose a substantial 
barrier for patients to start a civil law procedure against a health care provider. 
Moreover, under the Civil Code and thus under the Wgbo, the burden of proof 
lies with the party who lays charges ('claimant'). This means that he or she should 
produce all the necessary evidence to substantiate his or her claim when a case is 
presented in court. In medical liability cases, this is often a very difficult assign-
ment for a patient who feels that he or she has been wronged by a health care 
provider. The patient generally lacks the knowledge and information to ade-
quately substantiate his or her claim. This division of the onus of proof has there-
fore been criticized in the legal literature, but so far to no avail. Courts have modi-
fied the rules regarding the burden of proof in medical liability cases just in one 
respect, recognizing that patients otherwise would often encounter insurmounta-
ble barriers in acquiring necessary evidence. According to this modification, the 
defendant is bound to a heightened duty to plead (verzwaarde stelplicht), meaning 
that the defendant should, when pleading, provide all the evidence that the claim-
ant might need to support his or her claim against the health care provider. Oth-
erwise, the Dutch Highest Court with respect to civil law cases (Hoge Raad) has 
rejected to change the rules with respect to the burden of proof or otherwise to 
strengthen the position of the patient in medical liability cases. It should be 
emphasized here that courts in the Netherlands can change the rules with respect 
to the onus of proof if deemed in accordance with the principles of equity and 
natural justice. And neither the legislature has considered it necessary to foresee 
in different rules with respect to the burden of proof in health law. 
Thus, it is not impossible for patients to obtain financial compensation, but pro-
viding facts from which it can be deducted that damage occurred due to an attrib-
utable medical mistake by a health care provider is not rarely a high barrier. 
3.3 Psychiatric patients 
In 1994, the Insanity Act of 1884 (Krankzinnigenwet) was replaced by the Psychi-
atric Hospitals Compulsory Admissions Act (Wet Bijzondere Opnemingen in Psy-
chiatrische Ziekenhuizen or Bopz). One of the reasons to introduce a new act for 
psychiatric patients was to ensure that this body of law was in conformity with 
the ECHR. This has not only resulted in the codification of the rights of patients 
who due to a mental illness are being deprived of their liberty (Chapter Ill of 
Bopz, see also Article 5 of the ECHR and relevant case law), but also in the intro-
duction of a right to complain for psychiatric patients with respect to a number of 
constraint measures that can be imposed on the basis of the Bopz. Such a com-
plaint, that does not entail costs for the patient, should be sent to the board of 
the psychiatric hospital where the patient resides. The board should subsequently 
forward the complaint to a specially established complaints' committee that is 
bound to take a binding decision within 2 weeks after receipt of the complaint. 
The patient consequently has a possibility to challenge this decision in court. 
The filing of a Bopz complaint, that - as said - merely concerns constraint meas-
ures such as isolation, does not automatically lead to the suspension of the con-
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tested measure. The complaints' committee and, in appeal, a court can however 
decide that the measure should be lifted. 
All patients who involuntarily reside in a psychiatric hospital are entitled to the 
assistance and advice of the so-called patient's clinical treatment representative 
(patientenvertrouwenspersoon or PVP) . The PVP can provide assistance when the 
patient considers filing a complaint under the Bopz. Also a family representative, 
like a spouse or child, and a legal representative, like a curator, can file a com-
plaint on behalf of the patient. This is particularly important now that a psychiat-
ric patient's mental capacity to file such a complaint may be impaired. 
3.4 A general right to complain 
Following the coming into force of the Bopz a new act was introduced bestowing 
all users of the health care sector with a right to file a complaint about the way 
they were treated by a health care provider. The aim of this act, the Right to Com-
plain Act Clients Health Care Sector of 1995 (Wet klachtrecht clienten zorgsector or 
Wkcz), was to do justice to dissatisfied patients. A secondary goal of this act was 
to contribute to the quality of health care, in addition to such aims as the restora-
tion of the relation of trust between the patient and health care provider and the 
reduction of the power inequality between the patient and health care provider. 
The legislature wanted to achieve these goals by requiring care providers that 
receive public funding to create a low threshold for clients to file a complaint and 
to ensure the careful investigation of a complaint. This act was introduced after it 
became clear that patients experienced difficulties in accessing the existing legal 
remedies to file complaints, such as a civil law or a disciplinary law procedure. The 
act also sought to ensure that care providers would benefit from complaints, by 
using the outcome of a complaint procedure as impetus to improve the quality 
and safety of care to make it better match the needs of patients. 
Since the introduction of the Wkcz, all care providers receiving public funding are 
required to have a regulation for complaints and a complaints' committee that 
both meet a number of criteria set out in the Wkcz. Although not forbidden by 
law, complaints' committees do not levy a fee for a procedure; all costs are carried 
by the health care provider - and thus not by the State or another third party -
with the exception of legal aid should a party wish to receive the assistance of a 
legal expert. The complaints' committee is obliged to give its opinion within the 
period mentioned in the regulation for complaints. The committee can also make 
recommendations for the health care provider. Such an opinion as well as the rec-
ommendations are, however, non-binding for the health care provider. This is not 
to suggest that these opinions are void or otherwise of no importance. Within a 
month after receipt of the committee's opinion the health care provider is obliged 
by law to let the committee and the plaintiff know what the health care provider 
is going to do with the opinion and the possible recommendations. 
Under the Wkcz there is no right to appeal for the complaining patient (or the 
defendant) . The patient can neither otherwise ask for a revision of the opinion of 
the complaints' committee or its recommendations. On the other hand, com-
plaints' committees are required, due to a new provision in the Wkcz in 2005, to 
bring to the attention of the health care provider complaints concerning a serious 
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situation with a structural character. If the health care provider fails to take 
appropriate steps to improve the situation, then the complaints' committee is 
required to report its concern to the Health Care Inspectorate. 
3.5 Other options for patients 
Besides the above (quasi) legal options and the possibility to start disciplinary 
procedures against an individual health care provider (§ 2.2), patients have a few 
more options to express their dissatisfaction about the care they receive(d) and to 
try to get material or immaterial compensation for alleged substandard care. 
These opportunities can be seen as elaborations of the right to have access to jus-
tice for patients dissatisfied with the services provided to them by individual or 
institutional health care providers. In addition, reference should be made to two 
more options open to patients and a Bill currently pending in Parliament. 
Firstly, since 1999 consumers and entrepreneurs' organizations created the Dis-
putes' Committee (Geschillencommissie), a private initiative to facilitate out-of-
court conflict resolution. Patients can file a complaint against entrepreneurs, 
including hospitals, who joined this committee. Many health care providers have 
joined the committee since 1999. The decisions of the committee are binding. In 
addition, the committee can award financial compensation up until €5000, per 
complaint to be paid by the entrepreneur to the plaintiff. Since the fee to be paid 
by the plaintiff, €2750, is relatively low (and will be returned in case the com-
plaint is found grounded) and no legal representation is required, for many 
patients this is an attractive alternative for a civil law procedure. 
Secondly, patients can file complaints with the National Ombudsman. The 
National Ombudsman examines whether a State organ has acted duly (behoorlijk), 
that is to say with sufficient care. A complaint procedure by the National 
Ombudsman does not entail costs for a plaintiff, since these are covered by a 
budget allotted to the National Ombudsman by Parliament. Despite this and the 
substantial powers the National Ombudsman has, the assistance of the National 
Ombudsman is hardly ever asked for by patients who are dissatisfied about the 
services of health care providers. This has everything to do with the scope of com-
petence of the National Ombudsman. The law stipulates that the National 
Ombudsman is only authorized to investigate complaints against State organs, 
with some public law bodies even excluded. Health care providers, with the excep-
tion of (most) university hospitals, are all non-state organs. As a result, patients 
can only file complaints against State university hospitals acting as health care 
providers. 
Thirdly, in July 2014 the Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports established a 
national clearinghouse for health complaints (Landelijk Meldpunt Zorg). This insti-
tution, falling under the responsibility of the Minister for Health and closely col-
laborating with the Health Care Inspectorate, gives advice and information on the 
resolution of complaints with respect to health care. In doing so, the clearing-
house can refer a rlissatisfied patient to the most appropriate person or institu-
tion to express his or her complaint and, in case the defendant fails to respond in 
due course, can contact the health care provider on behalf of the patient. In addi-
tion - and from a legal viewpoint highly debatable - the clearinghouse passes on 
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information, including the names of all health care providers patients have 
expressed concern about, to the Health Care Inspectorate who can undertake 
action. The clearinghouse itself does not have a task and neither the competence 
with respect to conflict resolution, also due to lack of a legal basis. 
Fourthly and still optionally, a bill is pending in the Senate seeking to - as it is 
called - strengthen patients' rights with respect to complaints and disputes. This 
bill, the Act on Quality, Complaints and Disputes in Care (Wet kwaliteit, klachten 
en geschillen zorg, or Wkkgz), seeks to replace the Wkcz and some other pieces of 
legislation. Instead of an obligation for health care providers to have a com-
plaints' committee, health care providers should under the Wkkgz have a com-
plaints' officer with a task to find a peaceful resolution for a complaint. Different 
from the patient's clinical treatment representative (PVP) under the Bopz, who 
solely acts as patient's advocate, the complaints' officer is a more neutral and 
impartial intermediary between a patient and a health care provider. A com-
plaints' committee becomes optional under the Wkkgz. Instead, health care pro-
viders become required to join a national or regional disputes committee with the 
authority to do binding decision, both with respect to immaterial complaints and 
financial disputes up until the sum of €25,000. 
4 Access to justice for health care providers 
4.1 Introduction 
From the above, it can be learned that Dutch law foresees in various - and an 
increasing number of - avenues for patients to file complaints or to otherwise 
express their dissatisfaction about the way they have been treated by an individ-
ual or institutional health care provider, also by way of (quasi) legal procedures. 
But to what extent does Dutch law protect the rights of health care providers who 
allegedly did not treat a patient adequately? And does Dutch health law have pos-
sibilities for health care providers to institute a procedure against a patient? The 
answer to the latter question in: 'no'. Apart from the common legal instruments, 
notably starting a civil law procedure, there are no procedures health care provid-
ers can rely on when they feel that a patient has abused his or her rights. It is 
increasingly felt, at least by health care providers, that Dutch law falls short in 
adequately protecting the rights of health care providers. This can be illustrated 
by examining two topical issues. 
4.2 Right to reputation of health care providers 
Dutch law fiercely protects the freedom of expression. In line with the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) it is standing case law in 
the Netherlands that the right to freedom of expression not only protects the dis-
semination of information and ideas that are favourably received, but also - in 
the words of the ECtHR - 'those that offend, shock, or disturb'. Dutch courts 
acknowledge that the freedom of expression may collide with the right to private 
life, including the right to reputation, of others. When it comes to expressing 
views on health care providers that allegedly have provided bad services, the right 
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to freedom of expression is given ample protection - often at the expense of the 
right to reputation of whom it concerns. It is only in rare instances that health 
care providers win legal procedures against patients who allegedly have commit-
ted libel or otherwise violated the right to reputation of a health care provider by 
spreading infamous information. Health care providers often consider this unfair, 
not in the last place because they can hardly defend themselves without breach-
ing their duty to confidentiality. A health care provider who wants to challenge 
the accusations made by a patient concerning the services given can hardly do so 
without revealing information that falls within the realm of the duty of confiden-
tiality. Almost the only legal remedy open to health care providers who are, in 
their view, falsely accused of negligence or other forms of misconduct is to dem-
onstrate that the accusations are slanderous, disproportionately harmful to the 
reputation of a health care provider, completely unfounded and not serving a 
public aim. This makes is rather difficult for health care providers to stop, let 
alone prevent, expressions harmful to their reputation, even though there are 
cases where they successfully ordered the removal of such expressions from the 
social media. 
4.3 Punitive disciplinary law 
As was mentioned above, public disciplinary law is traditionally seen as a system 
of law to enhance the quality of the services of the members of certain liberal pro-
fessions, with the possibility to take measures towards individual professionals 
who do not adhere to professional standards. 
In line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Dutch courts 
have held that the right to exercise a medical profession is a 'civil right' under 
Article 6 para 1 of the ECHR. This implies that medical professionals against 
whom disciplinary proceedings have been instituted are entitled to a fair trial, as 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR. But can disciplinary measures also be char-
acterized as 'criminal charges', meaning that the enhanced guarantees of Article 6 
paras 2-4 of the ECHR apply, including the presumption of innocence, the ne his 
in idem principle, the right to legal assistance (Salduz), the principle of legality et 
cetera? So far, the ECtHR has not given a clear answer to this question. In the 
case Gautrin et al. v. France, the ECtHR referred to 'penalties' but did not distin-
guish between 'civil rights' and a 'criminal charge'. This seems to mean that the 
question to the answer whether a disciplinary measure equals a criminal charge 
depends on the domestic classification of the offences, the nature of the charge 
and the nature and severity of the penalty (cf. Engel) . Despite of that, Dutch med-
ical disciplinary courts have repeatedly held that disciplinary procedures cannot 
be qualified as a criminal charge. As a result, medical professionals are, for exam-
ple, required to collaborate in a disciplinary procedure and provide material, 
including burdening documents, instead of being entitled to invoke the right to 
remain silent, are not provided with legal aid and also otherwise deprived of the 
rights a criminal suspect is entitled to. Moreover, criminal and disciplinary proce-
dures are regularly instituted sequentially, with references made to the outcome 
in the 'other' procedure, not being marked as contrary to the principle of ne his in 
idem. 
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One can seriously doubt whether it is correct to classify disciplinary procedures in 
general as non-criminal. These doubts only increase taking into account a number 
of recent developments and announced measures emphasizing, at least in my 
view, the (also) punitive dimensions of disciplinary law. Let me illustrative this by 
giving a few examples. 
Since July 2012 disciplinary reprimands must be published in the State Gazette 
and a regional newspaper, mentioning the full name of the health care professio-
nal as well as the nature of the offence. A reprimand, a disciplinary measure that 
does not affect the competence to exercise one's profession, can also be retrieved 
by consulting the files of the registration authority for a period of 5 years. 
Since February 2015 the disciplinary courts hold that health care professionals 
can not only be disciplinary charged for what they have done in their capacity as a 
professional, but also for private conduct that may undermine the confidence of 
the public in the professional. In April 2015 the Central Disciplinary Court elabo-
rated on this expansion of the scope of disciplinary accountability by ruling that 
also disrespectful behaviour towards colleagues and not telling the truth are sub-
ject to disciplinary review and can lead to disciplinary measures. 
The Minister for Health has expressed the wish to further strengthen the puni-
tive nature of disciplinary law. The Minister wants, amongst others, to introduce 
the possibility for disciplinary courts to impose a lifelong prohibition against pur-
suing one's profession, a proposal recently embraced by Parliament that wants 
the criminal court to impose such measures on health care providers. The latter is 
remarkable, since until now a prohibition against pursuing one's profession can 
only be imposed as a secondary measure by a criminal court in case of a very seri-
ous criminal offence and only for a period of maximally 5 years. 
5 Conclusions 
In this contribution, I have tried to describe and analyze the legal guarantees with 
respect to access to justice for the users and providers of health care in the Neth-
erlands. It was noticed that over the course of the last few decades, patients' 
rights have gained importance. As a result of various laws, patients' rights 
towards health care providers were also strengthened. 
Patients in the Netherlands have, nowadays, a large number of options to express 
their dissatisfaction about the services provided by an individual or institutional 
health care provider and can institute all kinds of (quasi) legal procedures, also in 
an effort to obtain financial compensation. It is, however, remarkable that these 
procedures were never introduced, let alone inspired, in an effort to ensure 
patients' right to access to justice. In fact, the concept of access to justice was 
always absent in the discussion surrounding the introduction of these proce-
dures. That may also explain the haphazard way in which these procedures were 
introduced with a large diversity of preconditions for making use of them. In fact, 
without exaggeration one can easily assert that there is such an array of proce-
dures patients can choose from when considering to institute proceedings against 
an institutional or individual health care provider that the patient easily gets lost 
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in the legal jungle. This inspired the establishment of a national clearinghouse for 
health complaints (Landelijk Meldpunt Zorg) to assist and inform dissatisfied 
patients, although this above all reflects that the legislature has made things diffi-
cult for itself and for patients. 
Access to justice for health care providers is even less guaranteed, now that their 
role is almost exclusively reduced to that of defendants. While patients can, 
simultaneously or sequentially, start a large number of procedures against a 
health care provider, a health care provider can merely start a civil law procedure 
against a patient - or report a crime in such cases as violence. Due to their duty of 
confidentiality it is, however, rather difficult for health care providers to start 
such a procedure or to defend themselves in case they are being accused by 
patients of misbehaviour or medical negligence, for example, on social media. 
Health care providers increasingly face that basic rights related to the concept of 
fair trial are encroached upon in parallel with the enhancement of disciplinary 
law. This branch of law is ever more used as an instrument to punish medical pro-
fessional, however, without bestowing these professionals with the rights that 
should be respected in case of a criminal charge. 
If laws and procedures were designed taking access to justice as a starting point, 
then they would have looked differently. Even though, both patients and health 
care providers are everything but satisfied with the existing body of procedures 
that can be invoked in case of complaints, there has - to the best of my knowl-
edge - never been a discussion on reforming these procedures taking access to 
justice as a starting point. This is remarkable, as if access to justice is not consid-
ered to be a problem. As yet, it is difficult to say what should be done to change 
this perception, particularly if neither patients nor health care providers as well 
as their organizations advocate changes to this extent. 
The overall conclusion of this contribution therefore is that the access to justice 
has not found an inroad in the health care sector yet. This is not to suggest that 
patients and health care providers are deprived of procedures and procedural 
guarantees, but these are not always in line with the warrants typical to access to 
justice. It would be interesting to systematically asses all the complaint proce-
dures in the health care sector using access to justice as a yardstick to measure 
against . This will definitely lead to a more than gradual change is the legal land-
scape. 
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